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Introduction
Air Berlin, a self-proclaimed hybrid carrier, recently joined the Oneworld alliance. The Spanish budget carrier Vueling has started to offer interlining, and easyJet has agreed to publish its fares in a global distribution system. Such adjustments in strategic postures are traditionally seen as atypical of low-cost carriers (LCCs), but have become increasingly common in recent years. Fullservice carriers (FSCs) have also taken steps outside their traditional maneuvering space:
Germany's former premium FSC Lufthansa axed its business class on decentral (non-hub) European flights by handing over the network to its low-cost subsidiary Germanwings. KLM announced it would charge for checked baggage on its European routes, and Air France is continuously cutting its air cargo segment down to an aircraft belly-only business.
Such observations have led to a convergence trend among airline business models to the "mainstream middle" being occasionally hypothesized (see for example Bell and Lindenau, 2009 ).
The phenomenon of airline business model convergence, along with increasing similarity among airlines, has been subject to discussion among both researchers and airline managers, since growing similarity among airlines can potentially risk a disruptive market development and erode profitability (Dunn, 2012; Lohmann and Koo, 2012; Thornhill and White, 2007) . Leading LCC and FSC airline managers met twice recently to discuss the transition of airline business models and its implications for the future management of their airlines (e.g. "Airlines in Transition" Summit 2013 in Dublin). Overall, the significance of business model similarity and its impact on airline performance in the highly competitive and notoriously unprofitable airline industry is substantial and warrants analysis.
However, the potential change of airline business models over time has not been subject to intensive discussion in research. Most of the extant contributions on airline business model components are based on anecdotal accounts rather than being rooted in systematic empirical studies or have a limited scope (e.g. mostly covering the product features or network characteristics of an airline but neglecting further elements of the value architecture). First approaches to more comprehensive and quantitative research settings have been made by Mason and Morrison (2008) and Klophaus et al. (2012) . The focus on conceptual and qualitative research designs can, to some extent, be related to the lack of an established, systematic business model concept (e.g. Al-Debei and Avison, 2010; Morris et al., 2005) that enables researchers and analysts to precisely describe and quantify the business model components in the airline industry.
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However, Daft and Albers (2013) recently proposed a business model framework that is suitable for empirical analysis and makes it possible to conduct reliable analyses of airline business models and their changes over time. Such reliable and comparable analyses can be seen as key for deriving recommendations to airline managers in a highly competitive environment that emphasizes the decision to find a well-balanced strategy of differentiation and imitation (Norman et al., 2007) .
The aim of the present paper is to empirically assess the changes in business models among European airlines by building on Daft and Albers' (2013) framework. The framework (explained in the next section) will be applied to a sample of 26 European passenger airlines between 2004 and 2012. Initial results from calculations of the similarities among airlines indicate a considerable trend of convergence. Even though detailed results are subject to further analyses, our empirical study indicates a movement towards a hybrid model that combines business model characteristics from both the former LCC as well as the established FSC.
Our argumentation proceeds as follows. After introducing the airline business model framework and its underlying method of convergence calculation, we describe our data sample and present the empirical results of our analysis. The paper ends with management implications and an outlook for further research.
The Airline Business Model Framework
The term "business model" has become one of the most frequently used expressions in the management-oriented literature (Zott et al., 2011) . Irrespective of the industry context, the business model approach is used to systematically describe and assess a particular set of a company's strategic and organizational design parameters at a given point in time by evaluating a number of constitutional components and sub-dimensions (Morris et al., 2005; Shafer et al., 2005; zu Knyphausen-Aufseß and Zollenkop, 2007) . The business model concept aims to enable a precise description of a company's value generation system while keeping the framework and the data necessary for its dedicated measurement items manageable.
Following this logic, Daft and Albers (2013) proposed an industry-specific framework for assessing passenger airline business models. Their framework consists of 36 measurement items that are subdivided into the three major components: (1) "Corporate core logic", (2) "Configuration of value chain activities", and (3) "Assets". In order to enhance the structure and clarity of the framework, the three components are subdivided into eight dimensions, each of which consists of either two or three elements. Each of the resulting 18 elements within the three components are then measured by two items.
The framework is suited to the evaluation of airline business models and to ensure a consistent benchmark among different airlines (see also Mason and Morrison, 2008) . As multiple airlines, potentially with different business models, can operate within one airline group (for example, quality-oriented Lufthansa Passage (LH) and budget-oriented Germanwings (4U) under the roof of Deutsche Lufthansa AG) the airlines must be assessed individually at the business unit level. Accordingly, the framework is used to individually assess each airline that holds its own air operator's certificate (AOC).
Generally, the proposed airline business model framework uses one of three different types of scale for measuring the items. Where applicable, continuous scales are used (such as traffic numbers). Such data are aggregated for a respective observation period. However, for some items (such as "bundling concept"), continuous scales are either not available or not applicable. For these items, the framework proposes an ordinal scale with given preset values. Finally, the framework also considers items that are expressed by discrete values that cannot be sorted (such as the type of flight operations for the "basic operations design" item). Changes of all discrete item values within one observation period are considered in total, regardless of the exact date of the change within the observation period. The entire framework is illustrated in Figure 1 (item operationalization is displayed in Tables A-1-3 in the appendix). 
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Methodology for Calculating Convergence
The proposed framework can be used to describe an airline business model at a given point in time.
According to our research aim of analyzing the development of airline business models over time, we follow a longitudinal research design setting and compare the status quo of such business models in four different years to identify their changes.
For each observation point, we consider one calendar year. Therefore, continuous data are aggregated on a yearly basis (January to December). However, due to different fiscal years of airlines, we have extended the length of the observation periods from October of the previous year to March of the following year, which results in a time windows of 18 months for each observation point.
Because the business model framework we used is based on items with mixed scales, we need to find a similarity measure that can cope with mixed data. Commonly used similarity measures (like the well-known Euclidean distance) are only suitable for data with one single scale type. One of the few available approaches that are applicable to mixed scaled data is the extended Target productmarket combination
Target passenger groups
Role of air cargo similarity coefficient by Gower (Gower, 1971; Podani, 1999) . This so called Gower coefficient is based on elementary and commonly used distance measures (in particular in the field of cluster analysis) depending on the item scale in question and is mostly suitable for calculating pairwise (object-to-object) similarities (Podani, 1999) . The distance between two objects can be interpreted as a measure of their (spatial) closeness or similarity. Here the value range of the Gower coefficient is [0,1] where 0 denotes maximum similarity among two airlines while 1 would mean that the two considered airlines are completely different regarding the covered business model items.
For continuous items, the Gower coefficient is represented by the City Block Distance.
This metric (also called Manhattan Metric) calculates the distance between two objects based on the sum of the absolute difference of the item values (thus it is based on the two sides of a right triangle instead of the hypotenuses as used for the Euclidean distance). In case of ordinal items, the Gower coefficient is represented by the City Block Distance scaled to the item value range.
Finally, for nominal scaled items, the Gower coefficient is represented by the Simple Matching Metric, which just counts the cases in which the two compared objects have the same value for the particular nominal item (e.g. airline one and airline two both have the basic operations of a charter carrier).
For our calculation of the combined Gower coefficient, each of the 36 items is assigned equal weight. Even though equal weighting of all items could lead to strongly correlated items being overrated, a common weighting of all items reflects the intended power relation of the initial framework layout without systematic or random bias (Kaufmann and Pape, 1996) .
For each given year, the similarity calculation for n airlines in the data sample provides pairwise similarity measures. The overall similarity of the considered airline sample for the given observation point can be captured by calculating the average value among the pairwise similarity measures. Comparing these average similarity measures in our four measurement years enables us to indicate the change of the similarity.
Considering the recent dynamics in the airline market and the booming phase of new LCC entrants, we chose the period from 2004 to 2012 as this timespan falls into the decade of most substantial change within the airline industry. Also, a relatively long period (several years) is necessary in order to identify significant business model changes, because business model adjustments need 3-5 years to become implemented and thus observable (Viellechner, 2010) .
Thus, we will assess the changes of the airline business models during this period by considering the four years 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012. 
Data Sample
To ensure comparable results of the similarity analyses we formulated criteria for building a reasonable data sample out of the vast amount of thousands of commercial passenger airlines around the world. We used the four following main criteria to define such a set of comparable airlines: (1) geography, (2) airline size, (3) airline survival, and (4) airline operating unit (see Table   1 ). The geography criterion is the most restrictive: We focused our empirical study on European airlines, to ensure homogeneity in the economic market and regulatory contexts (this segmentation is also used by the Association of European Airlines, AEA). The minimum airline size limits our sample to the important national and international players, while small and smallest airlines (with only one or a few number of small and regional aircraft) are neglected. With the airline survival criteria we want to ensure that the data sample remains stable over time for methodological reasons. Moreover, data are hardy available for airline that ceased operations and little management implications can be derived from and for such airlines. The last criteria allows for the consideration of distinct airlines, which are acting within one airline group. The consideration of all criteria resulted in a data sample of 26 airlines (see Table 2 
Results
Based Table 3 ). In 2012, a low-cost carrier (Ryanair) again featured the highest average distance (0.4468) to all other airlines. Moreover, Ryanair was the only airline in the sample to increase its average distance and to become more differentiated from all other competitors, while all other airlines were becoming more similar.
In particular, the former charter carrier Air Berlin clearly moved towards the "middle" of business models; which is in line with the strategic reorientation of Air Berlin and the selfproclaimed hybridization of its business model (Flottau and Buyck, 2013) . Similar moves towards less differentiated business models can be observed for the Greek carrier Aegean, the regionally- Figure 2) . Considering the trajectories of the distances throughout the observation period (see Figure 3 ) also show, that the decreasing trend is almost stable, which indicates that the growing similarity seems to be a rather systematic than a random effect. Thus, overall our study shows an actual rapprochement of airline business models. A3  EI  AB  UX  AF  AZ  OS  BA  DE  LH  U2  AY  BE  4U  IB  KL  ZB  DY  FR  SK  LX  TP  HV  TK  VS is a first empirically grounded indicator of the convergence of airline business models. In particular, our study reveals that, in contrast to extant discussions of business models in transition, the observable business model adjustments refer to all three components of the business model framework. In addition to the usual adjustments of the observable customer product, which are common for mature markets, more fundamental elements such as the input factor policy or the fleet structure are also among the considerable changes.
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The results also indicate that the business models of the established FSC are rather stable, while considerable adjustments can be observed for the former LCC and CC. This observation provides support for the predicted trend that LCCs aggressively try to expand their business passengers segment since 2010, which requires more elaborated product features such as highfrequency route patterns to primary airports, frequent flyer programs and more spacious seating in a separated service class. Accordingly, for each of the related items (11, 18 and 35, 28 ) the data show a trend towards the FSC typical profile.
In contrast, the established FSCs mostly stay with their product features while also trying to adopt the cost-saving structures of the LCC. Overall, several business practices seem to be moving towards a "dominant" specification. While in 2004, for example, 8 out of the 26 airlines in the sample where neglecting all kind of passenger transfers (item 1), in 2012 only 3 airlines remain with pure point-to-point operations.
In the field of the configuration of the value chain activities major changes can be identified regarding the distribution (items 23 and 24). While the FSC invest a lot of capital to increase the online sales, the LCC convert their former online-limited distribution to omni-channel systems with increasing participant in global distribution systems (GDS). In 2012 only Ryanair leaves with a pure online distribution compared to 2004 where four out of the six LCC in the sample were limited to the online channel.
Also with regard to the assets we see a converging trend. For fleet homogeneity (item 29) our data shows that FSCs and RC try to reduce the number of different aircraft types in their fleets, while LCCs, which originally used single-type fleets, add new aircraft types to serve the expanded route networks. As these route networks are also becoming increasingly similar (for example regarding average flight length, see items 3), the necessary mix of different aircraft in the fleets is also becoming more alike. Another example for the converging trend is the infrastructure (item 32). While the FSC try to reduce their owned facilities, the other airline business model types extend their owned infrastructure from 2004 to 2012.
The increasing similarity of all airlines in the sample provides strategic maneuvering space for airlines that maintain their original business model. When all others become more similar, those that remain unchanged passively evolve into differentiators. However, the differentiation factor needs to be "in demand"; that is, valued by the consumer. For example, Ryanair, which is known to be fundamentally focused on its initial cost-saving business model design, is the only airline that was able to even increase the average distance to all other airlines. This could benefit Ryanair, which is clearly positioning itself in the pure low-cost segment, which seems to develop into a niche market, whereas the former LCCs are moving towards hybrid models. By leaving the pure low-cost segment, these airlines are contributing to the rise of a new, clearly separated lowcost market segment. Yet, recent announcements of Ryanair to become customer friendly airline might indicate that the ultra-low-cost business model has become obsolete, thus further facilitating the move towards a rather service oriented dominant design.
However, it remains unclear whether the airlines that are moving towards the middle will be able to establish new market segments based on a sensible mix of low-cost orientation and customer focus. Airlines such as Norwegian Air Shuttle and Vueling are good examples of players that redesign their business models by adding innovative elements and practices (for example, budget-oriented long-haul flights (see also Daft and Albers (2012) , and premium-oriented business classes) to their original low-cost models to catch new markets and customers. It also remains unclear whether the established full-service business models will remain the same or whether the FSCs will also try to reinvent their business models to build new market segments that are clearly differentiated from other airlines to protect profitability and long-term sustainability. Hitherto, such trends have barely been observable among FSCs.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to empirically analyze the actual transition in airlines business models to provide a platform for detailed empirical convergence studies as well as strategic-oriented research on business model imitation and its impact on airline profitability.
We have used a structured business model framework based on 36 items to measure a sample of 26 European airlines at four distinct points in time (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012) and have analyzed the changes among their business model design during the period. The results have shown that a considerable rapprochement of airlines' business models is underway. While several authors, as well as airline practitioners, have voiced reasonable suspicions about this development, we are able to provide empirical evidence for this convergence. Therefore, our study could help increase the awareness of both researchers and airline managers of a considerable convergence trend of airline business models and help develop suitable strategies with which to adapt to the changing airline business model spectrum. Only if managers are aware of their airline's positioning compared to their competitors will they be able to determine whether they prefer to increase the differentiation again by focusing on their own innovations and niche markets or opt to stay in the mainstream center (Porter, 1985) . Investors also have an additional tool with which to evaluate distinct airlines.
Even though we were able to identify such a move towards the mainstream center, it remains unclear whether airline managers intended for this evolution to occur. Based on an increased awareness of this convergence phenomenon, further studies could now focus on investigating the detailed reasons of the decreasing differentiation. Given this contraction of the airlines' competitive field (i.e. competitors becoming more similar), opportunities may arise for new and "other" competitors (e.g. Albers and Heuermann, 2013; Bergen and Peteraf, 2003) in the industry. Therefore, further studies should analyze the actual impact of the recent business model adjustments on airlines' financial performance (see also Alamdari & Fagan, 2005) and the resulting attractiveness of the industry for newcomers. This will help airline managers consciously decide about the (re)positioning of their airlines in the given business model spectrum, or even expand the spectrum by enforcing business model innovations. 
